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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 
[Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to . . . have a speedy public trial . . . 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial. . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-29-5 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
(ADDENDUM J) 
V. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(h) whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction of a 
first degree felony. In this case final judgment and conviction was 
rendered by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
vi. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss the 
charges against Mr. Martin pursuant to Article III of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers? 
(a) Did Mr. Martin substantially comply with the 
requirements of the Act in requesting disposition of the 
charges so as to trigger the 180 day limitation? 
(b) Had the 180 days run? 
2. Did the delay in bringing Mr. Martin to trial violate 
his right to speedy trial under the Utah and United States 
Constitutions? 
vii. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
TERRY MARTIN, : Case No. 870009 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony. Appellant was found 
guilty on December 16, 1986 after a bench trial on stipulated 
evidence in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding. A charge 
of Aggravated Kidnapping was dismissed by the State as part of the 
proceedings. The Court sentenced Mr. Martin to five years to life 
in the Utah State Prison to commence upon being released from the 
federal prison system. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In November, 1985, Mr. Martin was being held on federal 
charges in New Mexico (See Addendum A and B, R. 73). He was aware 
of outstanding charges against him in Utah and requested use of the 
Bernalillo County (New Mexico), Detention Center Law Library to 
determine how to take care of such charges. His request was denied 
because the Court had appointed counsel to represent him on the 
federal charges (See Addendum A). 
Mr. Martin was sentenced on the federal charges in New 
Mexico on January 17, 1986 (R. 73). Thereafter, Mr. Martin's court 
appointed counsel on the federal charges notified Richard Shepherd, 
Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney, in writing, of Mr. Martin's 
request for disposition of the pending Salt Lake County charges 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter l.A.D.). 
Defense counsel informed the County Attorney that Mr. Martin had 
been sentenced in the federal proceedings, but had not yet been 
assigned to a federal prison, and gave Mr. Shepherd all necessary 
information to locate Mr. Martin upon his transfer. Counsel's 
letter to the County Attorney was received February 24, 1986 (R. 
94) . (See Addendum B). 
On March 14, 1986, the Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney 
received confirmation that his warrant for Mr. Martin had been 
forwarded to the United States Prison in Lompoc where Mr. Martin was 
assigned and had arrived on March 12 (Addendum C). A month later, 
on April 11, 1986, the Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney prepared and 
sent to Lompoc a request for temporary custody under Article IV of 
the l.A.D. (R. 77) (Addendum D). The State has not established when 
that document was received by authorities in Lompoc, however, it was 
apparently received on approximately May 14, 1986. (See Addenda D 
and J.) 
On May 14, 1986, the appellant was officially notified 
that a detainer had been lodged against him in favor of Utah 
(Addendum E). The document informing Mr. Martin of the detainer 
indicated that should Mr. Martin desire to file a request for 
disposition, he should notify his case manager. Mr. Martin 
immediately notified his case worker that he wished to request final 
disposition of the Salt Lake County charges, as indicated by the 
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note penciled in on the upper right hand corner "wants to file on 
these." (See Addendum E.) Apparently, this is the only document, 
advice or information the custodial authorities gave Mr. Martin 
regarding the Utah charges (R. 73). 
On May 19, 1986, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office 
received a Detainer Action letter dated May 14, 1986, indicating 
that the Salt Lake County detainer had been filed (Addendum F). The 
May 14, 1986 letter also indicated that Mr. Martin was currently on 
a federal writ, and that Lompoc would continue the I.A.D. process on 
his return. (See Addendum F.) 
In a letter dated May 29, 1986, Mr. Martin's lawyer on 
the federal charges in California informed Mr. Shepherd of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office that Mr. Martin had been sentenced on 
his federal charges, and was reasserting his request for speedy 
disposition of the Salt Lake County charges (Addendum G). The Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office received that letter on June 2, 1986 
(Addendum G). On June 4, 1986, Mr. Martin was transferred back to 
the federal prison at Lompoc (R. 73). 
The Salt Lake Deputy County Attorney wrote Lompoc on June 
18, 1986 requesting information on Utah's request for temporary 
custody, mentioning appellant's demand for a speedy trial (See 
Addendum H). 
Lompoc did not reply to the June 18 letter until August 
22, 1986; the County Attorney did not receive that reply until 
September 5, 1986 (See Addendum I). That letter, dated August 22, 
1986, indicated that "Mr. Martin will be available to be taken into 
state custody on or after June 15, 1986." The letter offered no 
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explanation for failing to inform Salt Lake County that Mr. Martin 
had been available for over two months. 
Mr. Martin was transferred and booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail on October 24, 1986 (T. 8) and brought to trial December 
16, 1986 (R. 109) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Martin did everything within his power to trigger the 
180 day period under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, and substantially complied with the provisions of that 
act by February 24, 1986. The State of Utah was informed that Mr. 
Martin had been sentenced, his period of imprisonment, information 
on how to locate him in the federal system and his desire for speedy 
disposition of the charges at that time. Mr. Martin should not be 
penalized for the lack of diligence by California and Utah in 
informing him of the detainer and in transferring him to Utah and 
bringing him to trial. Because Mr. Martin was not brought to trial 
within 180 days of his request for disposition, the charges should 
have been dismissed. 
The delay in bringing Mr. Martin to trial on the Salt 
Lake County charges violated his right to a speedy trial under the 
Utah and United States Constitutions, and the charges should 
therefore be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT BRING MR. MARTIN 
TO TRIAL WITHIN 180 DAYS OF HIS REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION 
AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE III OF THE INTERSTATE 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS. 
A. MR. MARTIN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III OF THE 
I.A.D. SO AS TO TRIGGER THE 180 DAY PERIOD. 
The provisions of Article III of the I.A.D. are applicable, 
"(w)henever a person has entered upon a term of 
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution 
of a party state, and whenever during 
the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is 
pending in any other party state any untried 
indictment, information or complaint on the basis of 
which a detainer has been lodged against the 
prisoner, . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended). See 
Addendum J for entire text of the I.A.D. 
Article III (a), of the I.A.D. provides that a 
defendant "shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he 
shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer 
and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's 
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment 
and his request for a final disposition to be made . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended). Article III (b) 
provides that the "written notice and request for final 
disposition . . . be given or sent by the prisoner to the 
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of him . . ." and that such custodial authorities shall 
promptly send it to prosecutors in the receiving state. 
In the present case, Mr. Martin was sentenced on the 
federal charges in New Mexico on January 17, 1986 (R. 73). His 
term of imprisonment for purposes of the I.A.D. began on that 
date. See Romans v. District Court, 633 P.2d 477, 481 (Colo. 
1981). 
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As the Court noted in Huges v. District Court, 593 
P.2d 702 (Colo. 1979) when an order of commitment had been 
issued by the federal district court in Dallas committing the 
petitioner to the custody of federal authorities: 
His seven-year sentence began running on that date [time 
sentenced]. At that time, he was clearly imprisoned. 
The fact that the petitioner had not been transported to 
his eventual place of imprisonment at the time the 
detainer was lodged by the Denver sheriff's office is 
irrelevant. He was where the federal authorities wished 
to keep him. 
Id. at 705. See also Nash v. Carchman, 558 F. Supp. 641 (1983) 
(defendant's demand for speedy disposition effective as of 
sentencing); See also United States v. Hutchins, 489 F. Supp. 710, 
715 (N.D. ind. 1980) . 
Salt Lake County apparently filed a detainer based on the 
charges in the instant case while Mr. Martin was still in New 
Mexico. In the letter dated February 21, 1986, to Richard Shepherd, 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, Mr. Martin's court appointed 
counsel requested a speedy final disposition of the charges pending 
in Salt Lake County (See Addendum B). In a letter dated March 13, 
1986, the United States Marshall for the District of New Mexico 
informed Mr. Shepherd that the Salt Lake County warrant on Mr. 
Martin, along with the paperwork on the New Mexico charge, had been 
forwarded to the United States Prison at Lompoc, California, where 
Mr. Martin was serving his sentence (Addendum C). Mr. Martin 
arrived at Lompoc prison on March 12, 1986, the day before this 
letter was written (R. 73). Hence, the Salt Lake County warrant was 
included in Martin's paperwork when he was transferred to Lompoc 
Prison, and the detainer had been filed at that time. 
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Although Article III (c) of the I.A.D. requires that 
"(t)he warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and 
contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform 
him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the 
indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is 
based", the Lompoc officials did not inform Mr. Martin of the 
detainer until May 14, 1986, after Salt Lake County made its request 
for temporary custody, and two months after Mr, Martin and the 
detainer had arrived at Lompoc Prison. 
In Romans v. District Court, supra, the Court found that 
a fifty-six day delay in informing a defendant of a detainer against 
him was not in compliance with the statutory mandate that a prisoner 
be promptly informed of the source and content of a detainer filed 
against him. Id. at 481. The Romans Court held that the remedy for 
the failure to promptly notify as required by Article III (c) is 
dismissal of the charges (Romans v. District Court, supra at 481). 
As stated in McBride v. United States, 393 A.2d 123, 127 (D.C. App. 
1978): 
An assumption inherent in the I.A.D., therefore, is 
that an appropriate official of the 'custodial1 or 
'sending1 jurisdiction will provide the prisoner 
with the information necessary for him to assert his 
right to trial within 180 days in the 'prosecuting' 
or 'receiving' jurisdiction. 
In the present case, Lompoc officials delayed 63 days 
from Mr. Martin's arrival at Lompoc on March 12 to May 14 in 
informing Mr. Martin of the Salt Lake County detainer and, when 
officials finally informed him, they told him to notify his case 
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worker if he desired speedy disposition. The record contains no 
explanation for the delay. Pursuant to the holding in Romans, 
supra, the Salt Lake County case against Mr. Martin should have been 
dismissed based on the failure to promptly notify him of the 
detainer. 
Even though Mr. Martin was not informed of the Salt Lake 
County detainer until May 14, 1986, he was nevertheless aware that 
charges against him existed in Utah as early as November, 1985, and 
attempted to pursue disposition of those charges. At that time, he 
was refused access to the Detention Center Law Library and forced to 
rely on the lawyer appointed for his federal charges to pursue such 
disposition (See Addendum A). On February 21, 1986, counsel sent a 
letter to Richard Shepherd at the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
office, informing him that Mr. Martin had been sentenced on his 
federal charges and requested speedy disposition of his Utah charges 
pursuant to the I.A.D. The letter informed Mr. Shepherd of Mr. 
Martin's current location and as well as information on how to 
locate him, should he be transferred (Addendum B). That letter was 
received by the Salt Lake County Attorney's office on February 24, 
1986. 
As of Feburary 24, 1986, Mr. Martin had done everything 
within his power to trigger the running of the 180 day limit set 
forth in Article III of the I.A.D. Salt Lake County was aware of 
Mr. Martin's desire for speedy disposition under Article III and 
aware of his whereabouts as well as information on how to locate 
him, should he be transferred. 
Mr. Martin was not tried until December 16, 1985, almost 
ten months after Salt Lake County was informed of his desire for 
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speedy disposition. While the Agreement provides for tolling of any 
periods during which the prisoner was unavailable (See Article VI 
(a))/ the record indicates thatf at most/ Mr. Martin was unavailable 
from May 14f 1986/ when he was informed of the detainer while at 
Lompoc Prison to June 4, 1986 when he was returned to Lompoc. (See 
Addendum E and R. 73.) Even if the 180 day period is tolled for 
that three week period/ Mr. Martin was not tried until well over 180 
days after his February 21st request was received by the Salt Lake 
County Attorney. 
If Mr. Martin's acts prior to February 24/ 1986/ were not 
sufficient to trigger the running of the 180 day period/ his acts of 
May 14/ coupled with his prior acts, triggered the running of the 
180 days. As of May 14, 1986, the officials at Lompoc Prison, as 
well as the prosecutors in Salt Lake County were aware of Mr. 
Martin's request for speedy disposition. 
When Lompoc prison officials finally informed Mr. Martin 
on May 14, 1986, that a detainer on the Salt Lake County charges had 
been filed against him, Mr. Martin immediately indicated to his 
caseworker that he wanted to file a request for disposition under 
Article III of the I.A.D., as shown by the pencil mark on the form 
(R. 73, Addendum E). The form given Mr. Martin on May 14, 1986, 
indicated that should he "desire such a request for final 
disposition of any untried indictment/ information or complaint/ you 
are to notify your caseworker . . . " (See Addendum E). The 
penciled notation in the upper right hand corner of that document 
indicates that Mr. Martin informed his case worker that he wished to 
file a request for disposition. Based upon his efforts up to May 
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14, 1986, and the information he had been given, it was logical for 
Mr. Martin to assume that he had properly invoked the provisions of 
Article III of the I.A.D. 
The purpose of the Agreement on Detainers is to encourage 
expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against a 
prisoner and a determination of the proper status of all detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints (Article I 
of I.A.D., Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended)). To 
effectuate this purpose the agreement is to be liberally construed. 
Rockmore v. State, supra, 519 P.2d 877 (Az. App. 1974). 
Additionally, "the stringent sanction of dismissal is a prophylactic 
provision whose aim is not to give the prisoner a windfall but is to 
place pressure upon the state to give the incarcerated defendant a 
speedy trial." State ex rel Saxton v. Moore, 598 SW2d 586 (Mo. App. 
1980) . 
Many jurisdictions have recognized that a prisoner's 
abilities to enact the provisions of the I.A.D. may be hampered by 
the failure of officials to correctly advise a prisoner of his 
rights under the Act. As such, Courts have held that the only 
essential requirement a prisoner need comply with is that he give 
notice to the proper custodial official of his desire for a speedy 
trial. People v. Esposito, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 90 (1960); Rockmore v. 
State, supra. Relief should not be denied if a sending state fails 
to send the appropriate certificate. Rockmore v. State, supra at 
671; a prisoner is not required to police the correctional official 
to establish that the official performs his statutory duties, nor is 
a prisoner required to make sure that the form of his request 
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complies with the technical and procedural requirements of the 
I.A.D. Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 512-13 (Del. 1973). To hold 
otherwise emasculates the purpose of the I.A.D. Pittman at 512; 
Rockmore v. State, supra at 880. Mr. Martin's actions should thus 
be viewed as sufficient to invoke the provisions of the I.A.D. both 
in February and in May. His communication as well as that of his 
attorney reached the state of Utah giving the state ample 
information and opportunity to act. 
This Court should adopt the view that "substantial 
compliance" is the test for a defendant's actions triggering the 180 
day period providing the defendant gives some form of actual notice 
that he desires to invoke the I.A.D. See McBride v. United States, 
393 A.2d 123 (D.L. App. 1978); Sweat v. Parr, 684 P.2d 347 (Kan. 
1984). The I.A.D. itself provides that the statute should be 
liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes of expeditious 
and orderly disposition of charges as set forth in Article I. See 
Article IX, I.A.D. 
As to whether a defendant has substantially complied, in 
McBride v. United States, supra, the Court held that this should be 
determined by whether the prisoner has done everything that the 
I.A.D. jurisdictions could reasonably expect, given their own degree 
of compliance with an Agreement which they have the principal 
responsibility to implement. Id. at 128. Thus where Mr. Martin has 
made a good-faith effort to bring himself within the Agreement's 
purview, his failure of strict technical compliance would not 
deprive him of the benefits of the I.A.D. See State ex Rel. Saxton 
v. Moore, 598 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Mo. App. 1980). 
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In the present case, Mr. Martin initiated attempts to 
pursue final disposition of the Salt Lake County charges as early as 
November 1985. Salt Lake County was aware of his request for speedy 
disposition of those charges by the end of February, 1986. At that 
time, Mr. Martin had substantially complied with the provisions of 
Article III, and triggered the running of the 180 day limit. 
Even if this Court finds no compliance as of February 24, 
Mr. Martin again made substantial steps towards compliance on May 
14, 1986. As a prisoner without legal training or access to legal 
materials, Mr. Martin had no power to strictly comply with the 
statute. The steps taken were sufficient to inform both California 
and Utah authorities of his request and therefore sufficient to 
trigger the running of the 180 days. 
B. THE 180 DAY PERIOD HAD RUN BEFORE SALT LAKE 
COUNTY BROUGHT MR. MARTIN TO TRIAL. 
As previously outlined, Mr. Martin substantially complied 
with the provisions of Article III in making his request for 
disposition known in February, 1986 and again in May, 1986. 
On April 11, 1986 after Salt Lake County knew of Mr. 
Martin's desire for a speedy disposition under Article III of the 
I.A.D., Salt Lake County prosecutors sent a letter to Lompoc 
officials initiating an Article IV request. (See Addendum D.) 
While it is unclear from the record when that Article IV request was 
received by Lompoc officials, it is clear that it was received by 
May 14, 1986 and triggered the May 14, 1986 activity of prison 
officials in informing Mr. Martin that a detainer had been lodged 
against him. Furthermore, in the letter to the Salt Lake County 
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Attorney's office dated August 2, 1986, Lompoc officials referred to 
the Article IV provision requiring a 30 day lag after receipt by the 
appropriate authorities before a request for temporary custody will 
be honored, and stated that Mr. Martin would therefore be 
unavailable until June 15, 1986. This suggests that Lompoc 
officials received the request for temporary custody on May 14, 1986. 
Regardless of when the state filed its Article IV 
request, that request did not preempt or negate Mr. Martin's Article 
III request. Article III and Article IV are designed to serve two 
separate, but not mutually exclusive, interests. The purpose of 
Article III is to provide a prisoner with a means to require speedy 
and orderly disposition of untried indictments so that the prisoner 
will not be faced with the uncertainty of having untried charges or 
be precluded from participation in prison programs due to the 
existence of untried charges in other jurisidictions (See United 
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 341, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d. 387 
(1978)). The purpose of Article IV is to require officials in the 
receiving state to bring a prisoner they have temporarily removed 
from a prison system in another state to trial within a reasonable 
amount of time so that the prisoner does not languish in the 
receiving state (See United States v. Mauro, supra at 349). 
In Rockmore v. State, supra at 880, the Court noted that 
the receipt of a prisoner's request for speedy trial causes Article 
III to become operative and Article IV is then inapplicable. Such a 
finding is reasonable in light of the purpose of Article III and the 
reality that a prisoner may have difficulty strictly complying with 
Article III or effectively filing an Article III request for speedy 
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disposition prior to commencement of Article IV proceedings by a 
receiving state. If an Article IV request were allowed to usurp a 
prisoner's Article III request, a receiving state could make its 
Article IV request and let the prisoner languish in the sending 
state five or six months (as happened in the present case) then 
obtain temporary custody, triggering the Article IV time clock by 
the prisoner's arrival in the receiving state. Thereafter, the 
receiving state could bring the prisoner to trial within the 
required Article IV 120 days, but eight or nine months after the 
prisoner made his Article III request known. Officials in recieving 
states could use their Article IV requests, in all cases where a 
prisoner had filed an Article III request or where the officials 
knew the prisoner intended to file a request, to controvert the 
protections of Article III. Thus, in all cases, Article IV could be 
used to emasculate the protections of Article III, thereby rendering 
Article III useless. 
If this Court were to allow the State's Article IV 
request to usurp Mr. Martin's Article III request, it would be 
requiring the State to adhere to a superficial obedience only to the 
I.A.D. This is contrary to the purposes of the Agreement. See 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed. 2d 387 
(1978). 
In People v. Esposito, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83,- 88 (1960), the 
Court noted that the law would have "wax teeth" and be little more 
than a "legislative exercise in futility" if the State were allowed 
to proceed with the trial fourteen months after it had received 
notice of the prisoner's request for speedy trial. 
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Utah must not be allowed to use its Article IV request to 
extend the Article III time period after it had lodged a detainer 
and/or received communication of a prisoner's request for a speedy 
trial as such an action under certain circumstances could allow a 
defendant's trial to be postponed indefinitely. This Court should 
hold that an Article IV request by the State of Utah may not be used 
to extend the 180-day limit on trial where Mr. Martin has made a 
request for disposition under Article III. See Pittman v. State, 
supra at 509; Rockmore v. State, supra at 880. 
Should Utah have determined that it needed more than 180 
days to bring Mr. Martin to trial, the Agreement specifically 
provides that it could have requested an extension (Article III(a); 
United States v. Mauro, supra at 342) Utah never requested an 
extension or continuance in this case; it simply let the time run 
without taking action. 
Mr. Martin was unavailable to Utah for approximately 
three weeks while in Sacramento on other charges and, pursuant to 
Article V that time should be tolled from the Article III 180 day 
period. However, assuming that this Court finds Mr. Martin 
triggered Article III by February 24, 1986, after tolling the period 
for approximately three weeks, Utah still failed to bring Mr. Martin 
to trial for more than nine months, in violation of Article III. In 
the alternative, should this Court determine that Mr. Martin did not 
trigger Article III until May 14, 1986, Mr. Martin was nevertheless 
available on June 4, 1986, more than 180 days before his December 16 
trial. 
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As previously outlined, Lompoc officials took more than 
two months to inform Mr. Martin of the detainer (see pages 6-7 of 
this brief). In addition, Lompoc officials failed to inform Utah 
that Mr. Martin was available for more than two months after he had 
become available. (See Addendum I). In the letter dated August 22, 
Lompoc officials informed Utah that Mr. Martin was available as of 
June 15, with no explanation for the delay. (See Addendum I). Mr. 
Martin had no control over the actions of state officials, and 
California's failure to send the appropriate certificate to Utah and 
to offer temporary custody in a timely fashion are the types of 
delay and lack of diligence that the I.A.D. is designed to remedy. 
The lack of diligence by California should not be held against Mr. 
Martin and can be resolved and remedied only in his favor by 
enforcing the I.A.D. See I.A.D. Article V(a); Rockmore v. State, 
supra at 880; State v. Seadin, 593 P.2d 451 (Mont. 1979); Pittman v. 
State, supra; People v. Bean, 650 P.2d 565, 568 (Colo. 1982). 
Utah should not be permitted to rely on California's lack 
of diligence. Because of the prisoner's lack of resources and the 
purposes of the I.A.D., once a prisoner triggers Article III, the 
burden rests on the State to comply with the Agreement. See People 
v. Lincoln, 601 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1979). To require Mr. Martin 
to send additional communications to Utah regarding his desire to be 
brought to trial in a speedy manner is inapposite to the purpose of 
the I.A.D. and would place an unnecessary burden on Mr. Martin. See 
United States v. Mason, 372 P. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 
While locating a defendant places an additional burden on the 
government, to hold otherwise places a more onerous burden on the 
defendant: 
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[Alfter the prisoner has notified the receiving state 
under the provisions of the Act, he has a reasonable 
right to believe he has fulfilled his requirement under 
the Act. If he is transferred to another jurisdiction, 
the act does not require him to give a second 
notification. 
United States v. Mason, supra at 653-54. 
In addition to California's inaction, Utah itself did not 
act with due diligence after being made aware in February, 1986, 
that Mr. Martin desired speedy disposition of his charges. While 
the detainer was apparently filed before Mr. Martin left New Mexico, 
Utah made no attempt to gain custody of Mr. Martin until April 11, a 
month and a half after the initial request. While the record is not 
clear, it appears that Utah did not hear anything about its request 
until May 19 when it received the May 14 letter from Lompoc 
officials indicating that Mr. Martin had been informed of the 
detainer and would be temporarily unavailable (Addendum F). 
On June 4, 1986, Salt Lake County received a letter from 
Mr. Martin's Sacramento lawyer indicating that Mr. Martin had been 
sentenced and renewing for the third time Mr. Martin's request for a 
speedy disposition of the Utah charges (Addendum G). On June 18, 
Salt Lake County wrote Lompoc requesting information regarding its 
April 11 request for custody. (See Addendum H.) Salt Lake County 
received no reply to this letter until September 5, 1986, two and a 
half months later. (See Addendum I.) During this time, the record 
shows no further efforts by Salt Lake County to obtain custody of 
Mr. Martin even though it had been informed on three separate 
occasions beginning as early as February 24, 1986, that Mr. Martin 
desired speedy disposition of the charges. A state may not ignore a 
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prisoner's request for enactment of the Agreement (Pittman v. State, 
301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973) ) . 
Under the circumstances and the language of the I.A.D. , 
Utah had an affirmative obligation to pursue custody of Mr. Martin 
and/or to request a continuance if it appeared that the State would 
be unable to bring Mr. Martin to trial within 180 days of his 
request. Mr. Martin should not be penalized for Utah's lack of 
diligence and Utah should not be allowed to benefit from its 
inaction. As noted in United States v. Mason, supra at 654 (N.D. 
Ohio 1973), fl(i)t is dictated by our system of criminal justice that 
the Court place the additional burden on the government rather than 
the prisoner-defendant." In determining what acts occurred in 
proceedings under the I.A.D., there can be no presumption that the 
officials of a party state have performed their required duties in a 
valid and regulated manner. Romans v. District Court, supra, at 
481; People v. Gonzales, 601 p.2d 644, 646 (Colo. App. 1979). The 
burden of compliance with the procedural requirements of the I.A.D. 
rests upon the party states and their agents; the prisoner, who is 
to benefit by this statute, is not to be held accountable for 
official administrative errors which deprive him of that benefit. 
Pittman v. State, supra at 514; People v. Gonzales, supra at 646; 
and relief should not be denied a defendant when officials fail to 
comply with the provisions to which they are bound. State v. 
Seadin, supra at 453. The inaction by both Utah and California is 
precisely the type of abuse the I.A.D. is intended to remedy and the 
appropriate approach in these circumstances where Utah failed to 
bring Mr. Martin to trial within 180 days of his 
- 18 -
request for disposition is dismissal of the charges is against Mr. 
Martin. 
POINT II. THE DELAY IN BRINGING MR. MARTIN TO 
TRIAL ON THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CHARGES VIOLATED 
MR. MARTIN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial, in 
addition/ Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides a 
similar right and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the 
guarantee, providing in pertinent part: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled: 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district where the offense is alleged to have 
been committed. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f )(1953 as amended). 
This Court has recognized that the right to speedy trial "under the 
Utah Constitution is no greater or less than its federal 
counterpart." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in which the conduct 
of the prosecution and the defense are weighed. The court 
articulated a four prong test for determining whether an accused has 
been denied his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The 
factors to be considered are: (a) length of delay, (b) reason for 
the delay, (c) defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, 
and (d) prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay. The Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Barker approach in State v. Hafen, 593 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) . 
The circumstances of the case are controlling in 
determining whether a delay is excessive. See Barker v. Wingo, 
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supra at 530-31. The complexity of the charge is one factor to be 
considered in determining whether a delay is excessive. A longer 
delay is permissible in bringing a complex conspiracy case to trial 
than an ordinary street crime. Barker v. Wingo, supra at 531. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(h)(1953 as amended), provides some 
guidance in determining an acceptable length of delay. That section 
provides: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions 
or law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 days after 
arraignment if unable to post bail and if business of 
court permits. (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(h)(1953 as amended). 
Although this 30 day requirement is not mandatory, it is directory 
and should be given substantial weight by this court. State v. 
L£zano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah 1979). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended), the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers gives further guidance in determining the 
length of delay tolerable under speedy trial provisions of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. As previously outlined, the I.A.D. 
provides that a defendant held in a penal institution of a party 
state must be brought to trial within 180 days of making a demand 
for disposition (Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 Article III (1953 as 
amended). Hence, the 180 day period from filing of a disposition 
represents a legislative expression of the appropriate period in 
which to try a defendant who is incarcerated in a party state and 
requests disposition of a matter pending in this state. The I.A.D. 
also provides for the commencement of a trial within 120 days of 
arrival in the receiving state where the state initiates the 
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proceeding and no Article III request exists to require an earlier 
trial (See Discussion Point I). 
As previously outlined, Mr. Martin attempted to pursue 
disposition of the Salt Lake County charges as early as November, 
1985 (See Addendum A). At that time, Mr. Martin was forced to rely 
on his court appointed lawyer in pursuing a speedy trial on the 
charges. 
After Mr. Martin was sentenced on January 17, 1986, his 
court appointed lawyer sent a letter to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney, requesting speedy disposition of the Salt Lake County 
charges. That letter was received by the Salt Lake County Attorney 
on February 24, 1986 (See Addendum B). Hence, Mr. Martin asserted 
his right to a speedy trial no later than February 24, 1986. 
Mr. Martin again attempted to assert his right to a 
speedy trial on May 14, 1986 when he marked the detainer form 
presented to him by his caseworker and initiated his formal attempts 
under the I.A.D. to notify the propery California and Utah officials 
of his request for speedy disposition. (See Addendum E). He 
asserted it for a third time when his California lawyer sent a 
letter to Salt Lake County requesting disposition. (See Addendum 
G.) 
Martin was brought to trial on December 16, 1986. Over 
one year had passed since his initial inquiry into taking care of 
outstanding dispositions. Nearly ten months had passed since the 
state of Utah learned of Mr. Martin's request. And over seven 
months had passed since Mr. Martin made his May 14 request. 
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Neither Utah nor California provided an explanation for 
the almost three month delay between the time Utah requested 
temporary custody and the time California offered temporary 
custody. Mr. Martin was available for temporary custody as of June 
4, 1986, when he was returned to Lompoc (R. 73). Utah wrote Lompoc 
Prison on June 18, 1986, requesting information regarding its April 
11 request for temporary custody. (See Addendum H.) Lompoc waited 
until August 22 to reply; that letter was received in Utah on 
September 5, 1986. (See Addendum I.) The officials at Lompoc 
offered no explanation for the delay in responding to Utah's request 
or for the fact that Mr. Martin was available for over two months 
before Utah was informed. Utah offered no explanation as to why it 
made no further inquiries into the matter, a duty that is within 
reason for a state anticipating prosecution of a defendant. The 
states have thus failed to offer a reason for their delay in 
offering Martin a speedy trial. 
A defendant who is incarcerated is prejudiced by such 
incarceration while awaiting trial. One of the rationales behind 
Article III is that the lack of finality and the inability to 
participate in prison programs is prejudicial to an accused. (See 
United States v. Mauro, supra at 342.) The I.A.D. suggests that a 
delay greater than 180 days from request for disposition, without 
good cause, necessarily prejudices defendant. Speedy trial rights 
are designed to allow some foreseeability as to when proceedings 
will be concluded. 
Mr. Martin's speedy trial rights under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions were violated by Utah's failure to 
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pursue his case and bring him to trial within a reasonable time 
after the Salt Lake County Attorney was informed of Mr. Martin's 
whereabouts and his desire for a speedy disposition of his case in 
February, 1986. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Martin respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the matter remanded to 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for dismissal 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
0/ l«3-B4; revised 
LAW LIBRARY 
^DEFENDANT'S 
[^EXHIBIT ^ 1 
"&•*-> I^A~ 
« ^ <fcs I 
CDM 
I am requesting to be allowed to use the Law Library: 
PRINT NAME 
DATE A b O / ? , / f ? o " ~ /LOCATION S~S U * v.-
3ENCE: 
CASE NUMBER ^S~ 2 / *? COURT JURISDICTION: 
NOTE CHECK BLOCK PERTAINING TO CASE: 
TO /tot u.P Pus? H<STC*LV //XPHIAIJUS <?f £'t7i?c//T/<>o 
3SE Peerx 0*C{. tU»Si{ ttfoff. 
D Civil Federal 
D Civil District 
J!] Criminal Federal 
U Criminal District 
D Other/Explain 
ASSIGNED OR ASSISTING ATTORNEYCfeTfa ScHoS^fAp^ ATTORNEY PHONE '766 37*3 
( ' i RESIDENT SIGNATURE 
v e d : CDM 
APPROVED, 
REMARKS: y^Xc^^uZ^ 
DISAPPROVED 
&^*-*-<< 
DATE/C^-<S7TIME /S^J 
'/TVQVS, 
COM SIGNATURE & 
LAW LIBRARY 
FORWARDED FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE 
DATE /TIME 
ADDENDUM B 
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 
P. O. BOX 3 0 6 
ALBUQUERQUE. NEW MEXICO 8 7 1 0 3 
TOVA INDRITZ 
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 
February 21, 1986 
Mr. Richard Shepherd 
Assistant District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: TERRY DALE MARTIN 
Dear Mr. Shepherd: 
Please be aware that Terry Dale Martin is currently incarcerated 
at the Bernalillo County Detention Center in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico pursuant to a seven year sentence imposed by U.S. District 
Court Judge Juan Burciaga in the District of New Mexico in 
Criminal No. 85-219. He is hereby requesting final disposition 
by your office of any indictment, information or complaint or 
other charge pending against Mr. Martin in your jurisdiction. 
The Bernalillo County Detention Centerfs address is P.O. Box 
1293, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103. The phone number there is 
(505) 842-8008. 
Mr. Martin may, in the near future, be transferred to a United 
States Prison for continued service of his seven year sentence. 
Should that happen, his location can be determined by contacting 
the Unites States Marshallfs Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
phone number (505) 766-2933. It is my client's specific interest 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, his state 
constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process and his 
federal constitutional right to speedy trial and due process to 
have the charges pending in your office disposed of as soon as 
possible by trial or otherwise. 
Please contact me, his counsel in federal district court here in 
New Mexico, if you need any aditional information regarding Mr. 
Martin's demand for speedy trial. 
/ Sinp^r^Ly, 
PSt&r Schoenburg J 
Assistant Federal public Defender 
PS/lh-1 
TELEPHONE 
( 5 0 5 ) 7 6 6 - 3 2 9 3 
FTS 4 7 4 - 3 2 9 3 
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 
PO. BOX 306 
ALBUQUERQUE. NEW MEXICO 87103 
< ^ > 
OFFICIAL BUSINESS 
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. S300 J\ ^ 
POSTAGE AND FEES PAIO 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
U S C 4 2 0 
Mr. Richard Shepherd 
Assistant District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ADDENDUM C 
United States Marshals Service 
District of New Mexico 
12403 United States Courthouse and Federal Building 
500 Gold Avenue, Southwest 
Post Office Box 444 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87103 
March 13, 1986 
Richard S. Shepherd 
Deputy County Attorney 
Cour t s i de Off ice Bui ld ing 
231 Eas t 400 South, 3rd F loor 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Re: MARTIN, Terry D. 
Reg. No . : 02960-051 
Dear Mr. Shepherd: 
Your warrant on above subject was forwarded along with our 
paperwork to USP Lompoc where Terry Martin will serve his sentence. 
You will need to write to the records office to assure your warrant 
is outstanding. Write to the following address: 
United States Penitentiary 
Attn: Records 
3901 Klein Blvd. 
Lompoc, California 93436 
Sincerely, 
D. R. BACA 
United States Marshal 
DRB/cj 
U; S. Department of Justice 
United States Marshal 
District of New Mexico 
Official Business 
Penalty for Private Use $300 
12403 V S Courthouse <& Federal BuikUmg 
500 Gold Avenue, SIV 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 / * N \ 
.X 
H V 
o w 
u ^ 
4 f 
c 
<3-
x
 ^ 
& 
^Richard S. Shepherd 
<?}' Deputy County Attorney 
' Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Postage and Fees Paid 
U. S. Department of Justice 
Jus 431 
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ADDENDUM D 
(©ffte of ihs JSali ^Saks (Emmig JVttarnsg g 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorr»«y 
MICHAEL N. M A R T I N E Z 
OtMf Deputy County Attorney 
April 11, 1986 
Warden 
United States Penitentiary 
3901 Klein Boulevard 
Lompoe, California 93436 
Re: Terry Dale Martin 
Reg. No. 02960-051 
Dear Warden: 
I am making inquiry regarding Terry Dale Martin, whom I 
understand is currently housed in your institution. We have a 
local charge pending against said prisoner and wish to begin 
proceedings on the Interstate Agreement of Detainers. 
I am enclosing herewith Agreement on Detainers Form V 
requesting temporary custody in order that you may begin the 
appropriate procedures under the Detainers Act. 
Would you please verify that the above individual is in your 
institution and inform me of the terms of said prisoner's 
confinement. Thank you for your assistance. 
RICHARD S. SHEPHERD 
Deputy County Attorney 
kc/0173T 
pc: Terry Dale Martin 
Irving Marks 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
ration 
Livingston 
outy County Attorney 
• County Attorney Victim Services 
Karma Oixon 
Director 
O Justice Division 
Walter R. Eilett 
Chief Deputy 
Q Investigative Agency 
Don Harm an 
Special Agent in Charge 
Q Civil Division 
William R. Hyae 
Chief Deputy 
Q Governmental Services 
Donald Sawaya 
Chief Deputy 
jialt "Jlahe (Hountg Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
* # 
\ 
</ 
<"ttl* 
^^fifc***0 
t * > ' < \ US. POSTAGE* 
Annas ;j ^ / ^ 0 0.2 2 j 
H MEfER 2d3b7t, i * 
Terry Dale Martin, Inmate 
RETURN TO SENDER 
jAiOVED 
OblOT ACCEPTABLE 
()INMATE UNKNOWN 
ONEEIi INMATES FULL NAME A. REG # 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS FORM V 
Five copies. Signed copies must be sent -to the prisoner and 
should be sent to the Agreement Administrator of the state .which 
has the prisoner incarcerated. Copies should be retained by the 
person filing the request and the judge who signs the request. 
REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY CUSTODY 
TO: WARDEN, UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY 
3901 Klein Boulevard, Lompoc, California 93436 
Please be advised that Terry Dale Martin, who is presently an 
inmate of your institution, is under Information in the County of 
Salt Lake, of which I am a Deputy County Attorney. Said inmate 
is therein charged with the offense(s) enumerated below: 
OFFENSE 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony 
Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony 
I propose to bring this person to trial on this Information 
within the time specified in Article IV(c) of the agreement. In 
order that proceedings in this matter may be properly had, I 
hereby request temporary custody of such person pursuant to 
Article IV(a) of the Agreement on Detainers-
Signed: 
RfCHARD S.1 SHEPHERD/ 
Title: Deputy County Attorney 
I hereby certify that the person whose signature appears above is 
an appropriate officer within the meaning of Article IV(a) and 
that the facts recited in the request for temporary custody are 
Agreement on Detainers Form V 
Page 2 
correct and that having duly recorded said request, I here 
transmit it for action in accordance with the terras and t 
provisions of the Agreement on Detainers, / /[ )) 
kc/0155T 
ADDENDUM E 
BUREAU OF PRISONS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
In duplicate. One copy of this form, signed by the prisoner and the warden should be re-
tained by the warden. One copy, signed by the Warden, should be retained by the prisoner. 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
NOTICE OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT, INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT 
AND OF RIGHT TO REQUEST DISPOSITION 
Inmate . . i ^ I ^ i . J f f j y . J ^ ? No. . °2960-05}^ . j n s t .USP^Lompoc^^CA 
Pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers, you are hereby informed that the following are the 
untried indictments, informations, or complaints against you concerning which the undersigned 
has knowledge, and the source and contests of each. 
Taking a Motor Vehicle without Permission " ^ ^ y - ^ v<>y „« .^ C^s** 
Rofefeer-y in the F i r s t Degree v - ^ _ 
Kidnapping in the F i r s t Degree 
r 
Aa$. acta.
 f ^ a tfsMsM";*/* 7 Sfcr ^/-^ dry, ur^^ 
You are hereby further advised that by the provisions of said Agreement you have the right to 
request the appropriate prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction in which any such indictment, infor-
mation or complaint is pending and the appropriate court that a final disposition be made thereof. 
You shall then be brought to trial within 180 days, unless extended pursuant to provisions of the 
Agreement, after you have caused to be delivered to said prosecuting officer and said court writ-
ten notice of the place of your imprisonment and your said request, together with a certificate of 
the custodial authority as more fully set forth in said Agreement. However, the court having ju-
risdication of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
Your request for final disposition will operate as a request for final disposition of all untried 
indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against 
you from the state to whose prosecuting official your request for final disposition is specifically di-
rected. Your request will also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or 
proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein and a waiver of extradition to the state of 
trial to serve any sentence there imposed upon you, after completion of your term of imprison-
ment in this statee Your request will also constitute a consent by you to the production of your body 
in any court where your presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of the Agree-
ment on Detainers and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the institution in which you 
are now confined. 
Should you desire such a request for final disposition of any untried indictment, information 
or complaint, you are to notify . „ Jfo^-Case^.Manager
 0f the institution in which 
you are confined. 
You are also advised that under provisions of said Agreement the prosecuting officer of a ju-
risdiction in which any such indictment, information or complaint is pending may institute proceed-
ings to obtain a final disposition thereof. In such event, you may oppose the request that you be 
delivered to such prosecuting officer or court. You may request the Warden to disapprove any such 
request for your temporary custody but you cannot oppose delivery on the grounds that the Warden 
has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
DATED: _.^L}±lAl8± 
Edwin Meese, I I I , U.S. Attorney General 
(Insert Name and Title of Custodial Authority) 
BY: Peggy A. Kinman 
Administrative Systems Manager 
RECEIVED 
DATE 
INMATE NO. . . 
MARTIN, Terry Dale 
02960-051 
FPI LC 2-74 72C 7839 
ADDENDUM F 
U. S. Department of Justice 
Bureau of Prisons 
JO: Office of the Salt Lake County Att]| 
231 E. 4th South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Institution 
USP, Lompoc, CA 
Date 
May 14, 1986 
DN LETTER 
Inmate's Name 
MARTIN, Terry Dale 
Your 
SAME W a r r a n t No: 
Number 
02960-051 1 
85FS02430 | 
Dear Sir: 
The below checked paragraph relates to the above named inmate: 
• This office is in receipt of the following report regarding the above named: 
. Will you please investigate this report and advise 
what disposition, if any, has been made of the case. If subject is wanted by your department and you wish 
a detainer placed, it will be necessary for you to forward a certified copy of your warrant to us. 
gg A detainer has been filed against this subject in your favor charging Aggravated Robbery and 
Aggravated Kidnapping Release is tentatively scheduled for. 
however we will again notify you approximately 60 days prior to actual release. 
06-18-1990 via2/3rds 
QJ Enclosed is your detainer warrant Your detainer against the above named has been removed in compli-
ance with your request 
• Your letter dated requests notification prior to the release of the above named 
prisoner. Our records have been notede Tentative release date at this time is 
• I am returning your 
to serve 
on the above named inmate who was committed to this institution on 
for the offense of . 
If you wish your filed as a detainer, please return it to us with a cover letter stating your 
desire to have it placed as a hold or indicate you have no further interest in the subject 
• The above named inmate has been transferred to 
Your detainer/notification request has been forwarded. 
Qg Other: Currently th i s inmate i s on a Federal Writ. Upon h i s re turn , we wi l l 
continue IAD process . 
zgal Clerk 
for Administrative Systems Manager or 
Chief Record Officer 
Record Form 89 
April, 1978 
KP! LOM 1-C3 102SCTS/PK S334°«* 
Original Whits • Address®* 
First Copy (Green) • Judgment & Commitment File 
Second Copy (Canary) • Inmate 
Third Copy (PlnK)- Central File (Section 1) 
Fourth Copy (Goldenrod) « Correctional Services (Department 
UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY 
3901 Klein Blvd. 
Lompoc, CA 93436 
Official Business 
Penalty for Private Use, $300 
ATTN: 
1 ALIA 
Afk> FEES PAID 
Office of the Salt Lake 
231 E. 4th South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
County Attorney 
Richard s/fSpherd, Deputy County Attorney 
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ADDENDUM G 
BOUT o 7 ^ TERRY DALE KA 
I C < V « c ^ * ^ . ' ' I . A I J . N . B i / ' 
ARTIN Cr. S-.!iS-167 
DOCKET NO." 
JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER AO-245 (9/82| 
Msa 
fn the presence of the attorney for the government 
the defendant appeared in person on this date — 
MONTH DAY 
23 
YEAR 
WITHOUT COUNSEL 
WITH COUNSEL L 
However the court advised defendant of right to counsel and asked whether defendant desired to have 
counsel appointed by the court and the defendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel. 
Carl Larson, Esq. 
(Name of Counsel) 
i£A ^ 1 GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that I I NOLO CONTENDERE, I I NOT GUILTY 
there is a factual basis for the plea, 
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The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced Because no sufficient cause to the contrary 
was shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that: The defendant i l 
hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of r i V L \ V . 
YE.-35 pursuant to- ^ ^ U j , zrtQ «.isfendant is lo recsfvs credit for r.!me served. 
:T IS wfuiLP.ED 7if<r : •>» sentence is to n-r, consecutively, one ^fier che o~her» vv:n 
*ny senu»r.c? I'tst >.e is no* serving. 
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In addition to the special conditions of probation imposed above, it is hereby ordered that the general conditions of probation set out on the 
reverse side of this judgment be imposed The Court may change the conditions of probation, reduce or extend the period of probation, anc(| 
at any time during the probation period or within a maximum probation period of five years permitted by Saw, may issue a warrant and 
revoke probation for a violation occurring during the probation period. 
The court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney General and recommends, It is ordered that the Clerk deliver 
a certified copy of mis' judgment 
and commitmenctg the U.S. Mar-
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T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
M I C H A E L N. M A R T I N E Z 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
June 18, 1986 
hi 
^ 8 96 / 
A. J. Battles, Legal Clerk 
United States Penitentiary 
3901 Klein Boulevard 
Lompoc, California 93436 
Re: Inmate Terry Dale Martin 
Reg. NOo 02960-051 
Dear A, J, Battles: 
I received your detainer action letter of May 14, 1986, 
regarding the above-named inmate. I was subsequently notified by 
the office of the Federal Defender that he was sentenced in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California on May 28, 1986, Could you advise me as to the 
current status of our request for custody under the Interstate 
Act on Detainers. 
Mr. Martin has had counsel indicate his demand for a speedy 
trial and we are ready to take custody for the purpose as soon as 
he is available. 
RICHARD S. SHEPHERD 
Deputy County Attorney 
kc/0304T 
cc: Terry Dale Martin 
stration 
A. Livingston 
)eputy County Attorney 
mnistrative Affairs 
231 East 4th South Saft Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
Q County Attorney Victim Services 
Karma Oixon 
Director 
4th Floor 
3 Justice Division 
Walter R. Ellett 
Chief Deputy 
3rd Floor 
Q Investigative Agency 
Don Harman 
Special Agent in Charge 
4th Floor 
O Civil Division 
William R Hyae 
Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
D Governmental Service 
Donald Saw ay a 
Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
ADDENDUM I 
3901 KUin Blvd. 
lompoc, CA 93436 
August 22. 1986 
TeL. Cannon 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
231 E. 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: MARTIN, Terry D. 
Reg#: 02960-051 
DOB: 11-04-52 
Dear Mr, Cannon: 
Pursuant to your request for temporary custody of Mr„ Martin under Article IV 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, enclosed are forms BP-DIR-93 and 94. 
Article IV provides "that there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt 
by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored," You request was 
received by this office during May, 1986. Mr. Martin was advised of your 
request on May 14, 1986. Therefore Mr. Martin will be available to be taken 
into state custody on or after June 15, 1986, unless you are notified to the 
contrary. Before we can transfer Mr. Martin to your custody, we must receive 
the Agreement on Detainers Form VI (Evidence of Agent's Authority to Act for 
Receiving State). 
Final arrangements for pickup may be made by contacting our Administrative 
Systems Department at 805-735-2771. Please have your agents contact them 48 
hours prior to pickup. 
Be assured of our continued cooperation in matters of mutual interest. 
Sincerely, 
Administrative Systems Manager 
cc: Clerk of the Court 
Compact Administrator 
J L C File 
Inmate 
BUREAU OF PRISONS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should 
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor under 
Article IV, copy of this Form should be sent to the prosecutor upon receipt by the warden of 
Form 5. Copies also should be sent to all other prosecutors in the same state who have lodged 
detainers against the inmate. A copy may be given to the inmate. 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS 
RE: „.]^£*N_,_ Terry ?2^0-°5 ] L JI?L'-J^??Ji ^J^PfL^i-^-J 
(Inmate) (Number) (Institution) (Location) 
The (custodial authority) hereby certifies : 
1. The term of commitment under which the prisoner above named is being held: 7 y e a r s 
4205(a) 
2. The time already served: Date sentenced 01-17-76 7-months +90 days J.C, 
Ja i l Credit: 10-19-85 to 01-18-86 = 90 days 
3. Time remaining to be served on the sentence: 2251 d a y s 
4. The amount of good time earned: 5 6 days 
5. The date of parole eligibility of the prisoner: 0 2 - 1 6 - 8 8 
6. The decisions of the Board of Parole relating to the prisoner: (if additional space is 
needed use reverse side) N / A 
7. Maximum expiration date under present sentence: 1 0 - 1 8 - 9 2 
8. Detainers currently on file against this inmate from your state are as follows: 
Agg. Robbery/Agg. K i d n a p p i n g 
DATED: .&W*±J1LJ1*L 
Edwin Meese, III-U.S. Atty. General 
Custodial Authority 
CSU.o^ O ^ ^ ^ A Gt- ^  cr* 
FPt-LOM-1-14-77 
"MBY: Peggy Kinman, Admin. System Mgr, 
BP-DIR-94 
2-71 
BUREAU OF PRISONS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
In the case of an inmate's request for disposition under Article III, copies of this Form should 
be attached to all copies of Form 2. In the case of a request initiated by a prosecutor this Form 
should be completed after the Warden has indicated his approval of the request for tempo-
rary custody or after the expiration of the 30 day period. Copies of this Form should then be 
sent to all officials who previously received copies of Form 3. One copy also should be given to 
the prisoner and one copy should be retained by the warden. Copies mailed to the prosecutor 
should be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. 
AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
OFFER TO DELIVER TEMPORARY CUSTODY 
Date --Au<3ys„t.2J2.z.-JL986 
,-* Mr. T . L . Cannon _ ^ _ , . 
TO: „ . Prosecuting Officer 
(Insert Name and Title if Known) 
^alt^^Lajce^^ity^^Uj^ah 
(Jurisdiction) 
And to all other prosecuting officers and courts of jurisdictions listed below from which indict-
ments, informations or complaints are pending. 
RE: MAPTTN, T ^ r r y Number ...Q23J5.Qr.Q.51.U*l . 
(Inmate) 
Dear Sir: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V of the Agreement on Detainers between this state 
and your state, the undersigned hereby offers to deliver temporary custody of the above-named 
prisoner to the appropriate authority in your state in order that speedy and efficient prosecu-
tion may be had of the indictment, information or complaint which is (described in the attached 
inmate's request) (described in your request for custody of -4.trJUL-=8£- )• 
(Date) 
(The required Certificate of Inmate Status is enclosed.) (JH&ftjraqittkfedCfe^^ 
(Date) 
If proceedings under Article IV (d) of the Agreement are indicated, an explanation is attached. 
Indictments, informations or complaints charging the following offenses also are pending 
against the inmate in your state and you are hereby authorized to transfer the inmate to custody 
of appropriate authorities in these jurisdictions for purposes of disposing of these indictments, in-
formations or complaints. 
Offense County or Other Jurisdiction 
Agg. Robbery County, Salt Lake City 
&rjg. y-iririApp-ing County , S a l t Lake C i t y 
Offense (cont'd) County or Other Jurisdiction (cont'd) 
If you do not intend to bring the inmate to trial, will you please inform us as soon as possible? 
Kindly acknowledge. 
MwiJl-K5jessL-IIX«..Il^S^.J^tIyiy^--General 
(^ame and TitKfofCustodial Authority) 
0*sfc*L- V X A L V 3 j9t<<+ ft $ ^  
J L P ^ B Y - Pe<?9Y Kinman, Admin. System Mgr. 
«.UAE^.J4omBQC^.33^1-iaeJJi.Bl.vd,..LDjripoc 
(Institution and Address) 9 3 4 3 6 
A. My counsel is 
(Name of Counsel/ 
whose address is „ J ^ _ _ ( | j ^ „ 3 £ k _ _ ^ 
(Street, City, and Stats') V ' 
(£o_gl.2U_rJ22Z £ZZ—X2ji-JlLfJ 
B. I request the court to appoint counsel. 
/ (inmate's Signature) 
FPI-LOM-1-14-77 
ADDENDUM J 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law 
— Text of agreement The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby 
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions 
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree tha t 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and 
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other 
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party 
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and 
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status 
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to 
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the 
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States 
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availabil-
ity is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had 
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Arti-
cle IV hereof. 
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ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a terin of imprisonment in a 
penal or correctional institution of a party state, aricl ^heneveF'du?lfigfthe 
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis 
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered 
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and 
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, informa-
tion or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request 
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate 
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment 
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, 
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state 
parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and con-
tents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his 
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information 
or complaint on which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. 
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers 
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the 
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being 
initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, 
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or 
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the 
original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint 
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shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition 
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included 
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to 
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after 
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request 
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the 
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required 
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent 
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accord-
ance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph 
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permit-
ted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of 
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall 
void the request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried 
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have 
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a 
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance 
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for tempo-
rary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in 
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdic-
tion of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly 
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that 
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authori-
ties before the request be honored, within which period the governor of 
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or 
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in para-
graph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in cus-
tody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already 
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner Said authori-
ties simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts 
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with 
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for cus-
tody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall 
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the pris-
oner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his deliv-
ery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be 
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the send-
ing state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint con-
templated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original 
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and 
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, 
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver tempo-
rary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state 
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such 
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the 
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary 
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of 
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority 
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided 
by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the 
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the 
custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint 
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of 
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been 
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or 
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the 
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon 
shall cease to be of any force or effect. 
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only 
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges con-
tained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints 
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on 
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except 
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any 
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held 
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting pros-
ecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner 
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, 
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall 
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and prac-
tice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state 
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same 
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any 
other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pur-
suant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory 
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more 
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which 
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay 
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned 
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a differ-
ent allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among them-
selves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any 
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and 
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdi-
visions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time peri-
ods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said 
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by 
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally 
ill. 
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ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, informa-
tion necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state 
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agree-
ment may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. How-
ever, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any 
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time 
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect 
thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its pur-
poses. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any 
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be 
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held con-
trary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force 
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters. 
